Correspondence principles for concave orthogonal games
Silberberg  and Pauwels  have produced and clarified seminal results in the comparative statics of single-agent classical optimization problems. This paper extends Pauwels’ method to derive analogous results for stable Nath equilibria in a subclass of the widely used class of concave orthogonal games defined by Rosen . Application of these results to cost curve shifts in the asymmetric Cournot oligopoly immediately uncovers apparently new comparative statics results.
|Date of creation:||1984|
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- Seade, Jesus K, 1980. "On the Effects of Entry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 479-89, March.
- Pauwels, Wilfried, 1979. "On some results in comparative statics analysis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 483-490, December.
- Spence, Michael, 1976. "Product Differentiation and Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 407-14, May.
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