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Intellectual property and market size

  • Michele Boldrin
  • David K. Levine

Intellectual property protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. As the scale of the market increases, due either to economic and population growth or to the expansion of trade through treaties such as the World Trade Organization, this trade-off changes. We show that, generally speaking, the socially optimal amount of protection decreases as the scale of the market increases. We also provide simple empirical estimates of how much it should decrease.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Staff Report with number 360.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:360
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  1. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994. "Technology and Trade," NBER Working Papers 4926, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2004. "IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: the case against intellectual monopoly," Staff Report 339, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. Gene Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," NBER Working Papers 8704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Maurer, Stephen M & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2002. "The Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual Property," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(276), pages 535-47, November.
  5. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2002. "Perfectly competitive innovation," Staff Report 303, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  6. Paul M. Romer, 1993. "New Goods, Old Theory, and the Welfare Costs of Trade Restrictions," NBER Working Papers 4452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  8. Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 1990. "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 106-112, Spring.
  9. Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1996. "Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 1426, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Diwan, Ishac & Rodrik, Dani, 1989. "Patents, appropriate technology, and North-South trade," Policy Research Working Paper Series 251, The World Bank.
  11. Silverberg, Gerald & Verspagen, Bart, 2007. "The size distribution of innovations revisited: An application of extreme value statistics to citation and value measures of patent significance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 318-339, August.
  12. Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David, 2002. "The Case Against Intellectual Property," CEPR Discussion Papers 3273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1993. "Endogenous, Innovation in the Theory of Growth," Papers 165, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  14. Jean O. Lanjouw & Ariel Pakes & Jonathan Putnam, 1996. "How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data," NBER Working Papers 5741, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Romer, Paul M, 1990. "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S71-102, October.
  16. Nancy T. Gallini, 1992. "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring.
  17. Taylor, M Scott, 1994. "TRIPs, Trade, and Growth," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 361-81, May.
  18. Pakes, Ariel S, 1986. "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 755-84, July.
  19. Lanjouw, Jean O & Pakes, Ariel & Putnam, Jonathan, 1998. "How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(4), pages 405-32, December.
  20. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1990. "Trade, Knowledge Spillovers, and Growth," NBER Working Papers 3485, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2004. "The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000631, David K. Levine.
  22. Charles I. Jones, 2004. "Growth and Ideas," NBER Working Papers 10767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Scherer, Frederic M. & Harhoff, Dietmar & Vopel, Katrin, 1997. "Exploring the Tail of Patented Invention Value Distributions," ZEW Discussion Papers 97-30, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  24. Hart, Oliver D, 1979. "On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1057-83, September.
  25. Jean Olson Lanjouw, 1993. "Patent Protection: Of What Value and for How Long?," NBER Working Papers 4475, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Yang, Guifang & Maskus, Keith E., 2001. "Intellectual property rights, licensing, and innovation in an endogenous product-cycle model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 169-187, February.
  27. M. Scott Taylor, 1993. "TRIPS, Trade, and Technology Transfer," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(3), pages 625-37, August.
  28. Makowski, Louis, 1980. "Perfect competition, the profit criterion, and the organization of economic activity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 222-242, April.
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