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Strategic responses to bank regulation: evidence from HMDA data

  • Douglas D. Evanoff
  • Lewis M. Segal

The intent of fair lending regulation is to encourage loans in low income areas and insure that loan decisions are based on economic criteria instead of noneconomic borrower characteristics. We evaluate situations in which banks may find it in their self interest to respond to regulation in a strategic manner intended to improve public relations and appease regulators rather than to adhere to the true spirit of the regulation. We find some evidence consistent with such behavior.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its series Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation with number WP-96-7.

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Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Financial Services Research, November 1997
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhfi:wp-96-7
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  1. Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passmore, 1995. "Home purchase lending in low-income neighborhoods and to low-income borrowers," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Feb, pages 71-103.
  2. Douglas Evanoff & Lewis Segal, 1997. "Strategic Responses to Bank Regulation: Evidence From HMDA Data," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 69-93, February.
  3. Anthony M.J. Yezer & Robert F. Phillips & Robert P. Trost, 1994. "Bias in estimates of discrimination and default in mortgage lending: the effects of simultaneity and self-selection," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, pages 197-222.
  4. Stickney, Clyde P, 1975. "Window Dressing the Interim-Earnings Report: An Empirical Assessment for Firms Initially Going Public," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 87-97, January.
  5. Kane, Edward J, 1977. "Good Intentions and Unintended Evil: The Case against Selective Credit Allocation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(1), pages 55-69, February.
  6. Evanoff, Douglas D, 1988. "Branch Banking and Service Accessibility," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 191-202, May.
  7. Judith A. Chevalier & Glenn D. Ellison, 1995. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," NBER Working Papers 5234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Brewer, Elijah, III & Mondschean, Thomas H, 1994. "An Empirical Test of the Incentive Effects of Deposit Insurance: The Case of Junk Bonds at Savings and Loan Associations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(1), pages 146-64, February.
  9. Healy, Paul M., 1985. "The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 85-107, April.
  10. Startz, Richard, 1979. "Implicit interest on demand deposits," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 515-534, October.
  11. William C. Hunter & Mary Beth Walker, 1995. "The cultural affinity hypothesis and mortgage lending decisions," Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation 95-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  12. Paul Oyer, 1995. "The Effect of Sales Incentives on Business Seasonality," Working Papers 733, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  13. Munnell, Alicia H. & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell & Lynn E. Browne & James McEneaney, 1996. "Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 25-53, March.
  14. Hunter, William C & Walker, Mary Beth, 1996. "The Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and Mortgage Lending Decisions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 57-70, July.
  15. Griffith L. Garwood & Dolores S. Smith, 1993. "The Community Reinvestment Act: evolution and current issues," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Apr, pages 251-267.
  16. Paul W. Bauer & Brian A. Cromwell, 1994. "A Monte Carlo examination of bias tests in mortgage lending," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 27-40.
  17. Allen, Linda & Saunders, Anthony, 1992. "Bank window dressing: Theory and evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 585-623, June.
  18. Josef Lakonishok & Andrei Shleifer & Richard Thaler & Robert Vishny, 1991. "Window Dressing by Pension Fund Managers," NBER Working Papers 3617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Evanoff, Douglas D., 1990. "An empirical examination of bank reserve management behavior," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 131-143, March.
  20. Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passmore, 1995. "Credit risk and the provision of mortgages to lower-income and minority homebuyers," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Nov, pages 989-1016.
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