Inflation targeting in the 1990s: the experiences of New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom
We survey the recent experiences of three industrial countries -- New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom -- that have announced specific targets for inflation. Despite success on the part of the targeting central banks in attaining their inflation goals thus far, bond yields suggest that long-term inflation expectations for these countries persistently tended to exceed long-term targets throughout the first several years of targeting. For New Zealand and Canada, survey data generally implied that inflation also was expected to exceed its targeted level in the near term.
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