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Demand Segmentation in the Federal Funds Market

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Abstract

This paper outlines a model of demand segmentation in the federal funds market with two types of borrowers - the "interest on reserves (IOR) arbitrage'' type and the "regulatory'' type - which have different reservation prices and cannot always be separated. When fed funds trade above IOR, the "regulatory" type is revealed and consequently pays an interest rate closer to its real reservation price, pushing the fed funds rate further up. When fed funds trade below IOR, a decrease in the fed funds rate encourages entry in the market for IOR arbitrage purposes thus counteracting the downward pressure on the fed funds rate. We use probit regression models and daily data for the period April 2018 to February 2020 to provide empirical support for this model. We find the following: 1) When fed funds trade above IOR, there is, on average, a 10 percentage points increase in the probability that the fed funds rate increases the following period. Furthermore, analysis using confidential bank-level data shows that this increase in the probability is higher for banks that report their liquidity profile daily and that were present all trading days during this period. 2) When the fed funds trade below IOR, the probability of a decrease in the fed funds rate decreases with the widening of the spread between the fed funds rate and IOR.

Suggested Citation

  • Manjola Tase, 2022. "Demand Segmentation in the Federal Funds Market," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-071, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2022-71
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2022.071
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Adam B. Ashcraft & Darrell Duffie, 2007. "Systemic Illiquidity in the Federal Funds Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 221-225, May.
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    5. Elizabeth Klee & Zeynep Senyuz & Emre Yoldas, 2019. "Effects of Changing Monetary and Regulatory Policy on Money Markets," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 15(4), pages 165-205, October.
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    7. Bech, Morten L. & Klee, Elizabeth, 2011. "The mechanics of a graceful exit: Interest on reserves and segmentation in the federal funds market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(5), pages 415-431.
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    JEL classification:

    • E49 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Other
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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