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A Macroprudential Perspective on the Regulatory Boundaries of U.S. Financial Assets

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Abstract

This paper uses data from the Financial Accounts of the United States to map out the regulatory boundaries of assets held by U.S. financial institutions from a macroprudential perspective. We provide a quantitative measure of the regulatory perimeter—the boundary between the part of the financial sector that is subject to some form of prudential regulatory oversight and that which is not—and show how it has evolved over the past forty years. Additionally, we measure the boundaries between different regulatory agencies and financial institutions that operate within the regulatory perimeter and illustrate how these boundaries potentially become blurred in the face of regulatory overlap. Quantifying the regulatory perimeter and the boundaries for macroprudential regulators within the perimeter is informative for assessing financial stability risks over the credit cycle.

Suggested Citation

  • David M. Arseneau & Grace Brang & Matt Darst & Jacob M. M. Faber & David E. Rappoport & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2022. "A Macroprudential Perspective on the Regulatory Boundaries of U.S. Financial Assets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-002, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2022-02
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2022.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Dávila & Ansgar Walther, 2021. "Corrective Regulation with Imperfect Instruments," NBER Working Papers 29160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Regulatory reach; Boundary problem; Financial institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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