Discussion of Preston, "Learning about monetary policy rules when long-horizon expectations matter"
The design of interest rate rules for conducting monetary policy have recently been examined for two key concerns. The first issue is determinacy of equilibria. Indeterminacy (multiplicity of stationary rational expectations equilibria) is a concern in models of monopolistic competition and price stickiness are currently a popular framework for the study of monetary policy. The second issue is stability of equilibria under adaptive learning. Some interest rate rules do not perform well when the expectations of the agents get out of equilibrium, e.g. as a result of structural shifts.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1000 Peachtree St., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309|
Web page: http://www.frbatlanta.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bullard, James & Mitra, Kaushik, 2002.
"Learning about monetary policy rules,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1105-1129, September.
- Kaushik Mitra & James Bullard, "undated". "Learning About Monetary Policy Rules," Discussion Papers 00/41, Department of Economics, University of York.
- James B. Bullard & Kaushik Mitra, 2002. "Learning about monetary policy rules," Working Papers 2000-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.