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Labour supply responses to reducing the risk of losing disability insurance benefits

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  • Paukkeri, Tuuli
  • Ravaska, Terhi

Abstract

We study whether disability insurance (DI) recipients increase their labour supply after the introduction of an automatic reinstatement policy, i.e. a programme mitigating the risk of losing eligibility for DI benefits due to a trial period of substantially increased work. We use Finnish administrative data and identify the effect of the policy on partial DI recipients by using partial DI applicants whose application was rejected as a control group. Partial DI recipients by definition have substantial remaining work capacity and are therefore potentially more responsive to programmes affecting work incentives than full DI benefit recipients. The rejected individuals have similar work histories, health impairments and remaining work capacity to those who are allowed benefits, enabling us to estimate the effects of automatic reinstatement on labour supply with a credible control group. Based on our estimation results, automatic reinstatement of benefits increases annual earnings modestly, but for those with mental disorders the effect is larger.

Suggested Citation

  • Paukkeri, Tuuli & Ravaska, Terhi, 2024. "Labour supply responses to reducing the risk of losing disability insurance benefits," Working Papers 163, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:fer:wpaper:163
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alexander Gelber & Timothy J. Moore & Alexander Strand, 2017. "The Effect of Disability Insurance Payments on Beneficiaries' Earnings," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 229-261, August.
    2. Zaresani, Arezou & Olivo-Villabrille, Miguel, 2022. "Return-to-work policies’ clawback regime and labor supply in disability insurance programs," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
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    7. Deuchert, Eva & Eugster, Beatrix, 2019. "Income and substitution effects of a disability insurance reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 1-14.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    disability insurance; labour supply; automatic reinstatement; Social security; taxation and inequality; J14; H55; fi=Sosiaaliturva|sv=Social trygghet|en=Social security|; fi=Työmarkkinat|sv=Arbetsmarknad|en=Labour markets|;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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