Firm Regulation and Profit-Sharing: A Real Option Approach
To avoid high profit levels often experienced in countries where monopolies in public utility sectors are regulated through price-cap mechanisms, several regulatory agencies have recently introduced profit-sharing (PS) clauses aimed at obtaining price reductions to the benefit of consumers. However, the implementation of these PS clauses has often turned out to be severely con- trained by the incompleteness of the price-cap itself and the non-verifiability of firms’profits. This paper studies the properties of a second-best optimal PS mechanism designed by the regulator to induce the regulated monopolist to divert part of its profits to custormers. In a dynamic model where a reg- ulated monopolist manages a long-term franchise contract and the regulator has the option to revoke the contract if there are serious welfare losses, we first derive the welfare maximising PS mechanism under verifiability of prof- its. Subsequently, we explore the sustainability of the PS mechanism under non-verifiability of profits. In a infinite-horizon game, it is showed that the dynamic sustainability of the PS clause crucially depends upon the magni- tude of the regulator’s revocation cost: the higher this cost, the lower the profit shared and the less frequent the regulator’s PS introduction. Finally, we present the endogenous and dynamic price adjustment which follows the adoption of the investigated PS mechanism in a price-cap regulation setting.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Corso Magenta, 63 - 20123 Milan|
Web page: http://www.feem.it/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cox, John C. & Ross, Stephen A., 1976. "The valuation of options for alternative stochastic processes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1-2), pages 145-166.
- Michele Moretto & Paolo Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2003.
"Investment Size and Firm's Value under Profit Sharing Regulation,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1040, CESifo Group Munich.
- Michele Moretto & Paolo M. Panteghini & Carlo Scarpa, 2003. "Investment Size and Firm’s Value Under Profit Sharing Regulation," Working Papers 2003.80, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, March.
- Klein, Daniel B. & O'Flaherty, Brendan, 1993.
"A game-theoretic rendering of promises and threats,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 295-314, August.
- Klein, D.B., 1991. "A Game-Theoretic rendering of Promises and Threats," Papers 90-91-21, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Simon, Leo K. & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 1987.
"Extensive From Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt03x115sh, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1989. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 1171-1214, September.
- Leo K. Simon and Maxwell B. Stinchcombe., 1987. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Economics Working Papers 8746, University of California at Berkeley.
- Harrison, J. Michael & Kreps, David M., 1979. "Martingales and arbitrage in multiperiod securities markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 381-408, June.
- Sappington, David E. M. & Weisman, Dennis L., 1996. "Revenue sharing in incentive regulation plans," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 229-248, September.
- Crew, Michael A & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1996. "Incentive Regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States: Some Lessons," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 211-25, May.
- Robert McDonald & Daniel Siegel, 1986. "The Value of Waiting to Invest," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 707-727.
- Bergin, James & MacLeod, W Bentley, 1993. "Continuous Time Repeated Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(1), pages 21-37, February.
- Bawa, Vijay S & Sibley, David S, 1980. "Dynamic Behavior of a Firm Subject to Stochastic Regulatory Review," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(3), pages 627-42, October.
- Lyon, Thomas P, 1996.
"A Model of Sliding-Scale Regulation,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 227-47, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.