Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria
We provide an existence and a uniqueness result for coalitional equilibria of a game in strategic form. Both results are illustrated for a public good game and a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly game.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2005|
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- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993.
"Equilibrium Binding Agreements,"
21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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