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Order Flow and the Formation of Dealer Bids: An Analysis of Information and Strategic Behavior in the Government of Canada Securities Auctions

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Listed:
  • Samita Sareen

    (Duke University)

  • Ali Hortacsu

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

Using data on Government of Canada securities auctions, this paper shows that in countries where direct access to primary issuance is restricted to government securities dealers, Order-flow" information is a key source of private information for these security dealers. Order-flow information is revealed to a security dealer through his interactions with customers, who can place bids in the auctions only through the security dealer. Since each dealer interacts with a different set of customers, they, in effect, see different portions of the market demand and supply curves, leading to differing private inferences of where the equilibrium price might.

Suggested Citation

  • Samita Sareen & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "Order Flow and the Formation of Dealer Bids: An Analysis of Information and Strategic Behavior in the Government of Canada Securities Auctions," Working Papers 2004.145, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2004.145
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kjell G. Nyborg & Kristian Rydqvist & Suresh M. Sundaresan, 2002. "Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 394-424, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bindseil, Ulrich & Nyborg, Kjell G. & Strebulaev, Ilya A., 2002. "Bidding and performance in repo auctions: evidence from ECB open market operations," Working Paper Series 157, European Central Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Treasury auctions; Behavioural finance;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • L88 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Government Policy

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