Congestion management rules and trading strategies
This paper empirically investigates how the economic incentives embodied in the rules governing the resolution of transmission constraints in the Spanish wholesale electricity market have influenced the trading strategies spanning all the sections of the market followed by buyers and sellers. The results show several facts with far reaching consequences. First, participants in the spot market follow dynamic trading strategies that span all the sections of the market, i.e. their strategies take into account the effects of participation in one section of the market over another. Second, the results show the importance of the structure of economic incentives implied by the regulations in explaining the trading behaviour of market participants. In particular, producers seem to be able to recognize and exploit the consequences of their role in the resolution of transmission constraints, and buyers respond to the way congestion costs are billed to them. Third, participation in the resolution of transmission constraints does not affect the revenues of all production facilities in the same way, due to the different roles they play in the procedure, coupled with the asymmetric reward scheme. Finally, the results shed light on what should be expected of the recent reforms in the aforementioned rules.
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- Fabra, Natalia & Toro, Juan, 2005.
"Price wars and collusion in the Spanish electricity market,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 155-181, April.
- Natalia Fabra & Juan Toro, 2001. "Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2001/05, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Juan Toro & Natalia Fabra, 2002. "Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market," Economics Series Working Papers 136, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Natalia Fabra & Juan Toro, 2002. "Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market," Industrial Organization 0212001, EconWPA, revised 31 Aug 2003.
- Pardo, Angel & Meneu, Vicente & Valor, Enric, 2002. "Temperature and seasonality influences on Spanish electricity load," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 55-70, January.
- Arocena, Pablo & Kuhn, Kai-Uwe- & Regibeau, Pierre, 1999. "Regulatory reform in the Spanish electricity industry: a missed opportunity for competition," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 387-399, July.
- Richard Green, 2001. "Markets for Electricity in Europe," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(3), pages 329-345. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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