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Output Persistence and Upside Down Electoral Business Cycles, What Does Really Matter?

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  • António Caleiro

    (Department of Economics, University of Évora)

Abstract

This note shows in what circumstances output persistence may invert the pattern of the electoral cycle when inflation expectations are of the adaptive or rational type and the government preferences are quadratic over output and inflation

Suggested Citation

  • António Caleiro, 2006. "Output Persistence and Upside Down Electoral Business Cycles, What Does Really Matter?," Economics Working Papers 04_2006, University of Évora, Department of Economics (Portugal).
    • Handle: RePEc:evo:wpecon:04_2006
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10174/8442
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gartner, Manfred, 1996. "Political business cycles when real activity is persistent," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 679-692.
    2. Lockwood, Ben, 1997. "State-Contingent Inflation Contracts and Unemployment Persistence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 286-299, August.
    3. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
    4. Gartner, Manfred, 1999. "The election cycle in the inflation bias: evidence from the G-7 countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 705-725, November.
    5. Jonsson, Gunnar, 1997. "Monetary politics and unemployment persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 303-325, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electoral Cycles; Output persistence;

    JEL classification:

    • E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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