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Shared Renewable Resource and International Trade: Technical measures for fisheries management

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  • TAKARADA Yasuhiro

Abstract

We examine trade and strategic interaction between countries that enforce technical measures for fisheries management (e.g., restrictions on fishing gears, vessels, areas and time) when countries share access to a common resource stock. Although technical measures are important as basic management tools, compliance with such measures makes it more costly for the fishermen to catch a certain quantity of fish. We show that under bilateral management, the resource exporting country gains from trade, whereas trade causes the steady state utility to fall in the resource importing country because the resource exporting country implements non-cooperative resource management when demand for a harvest is not so high. Under sufficiently high demand for a harvest, maximum sustainable yield can be attained after trade by what we call cooperative management; a situation in which both countries are better off. Under low demand for a harvest, trade benefits the resource importing country but may harm the resource exporting country regardless of whether it implements strict resource management or not.

Suggested Citation

  • TAKARADA Yasuhiro, 2010. "Shared Renewable Resource and International Trade: Technical measures for fisheries management," Discussion papers 10035, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  • Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:10035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brander, James A. & Scott Taylor, M., 1997. "International trade between consumer and conservationist countries," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 267-297, November.
    2. Naoto Jinji, 2007. "International trade and renewable resources under asymmetries of resource abundance and resource management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(4), pages 621-642, August.
    3. Diekert, Florian K. & Hjermann, Dag Ø. & Nævdal, Eric & Stenseth, Nils Chr., 2010. "Non-cooperative exploitation of multi-cohort fisheries--The role of gear selectivity in the North-East Arctic cod fishery," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 78-92, January.
    4. Michael Francis, 2005. "Trade and the enforcement of environmental property rights," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 281-298.
    5. McWhinnie, Stephanie F., 2009. "The tragedy of the commons in international fisheries: An empirical examination," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 321-333, May.
    6. Ali Emami & Richard S. Johnston, 2000. "Unilateral Resource Management in a Two-Country General Equilibrium Model of Trade in a Renewable Fishery Resource," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(1), pages 161-172.
    7. Hotte, Louis & Long, Ngo Van & Tian, Huilan, 2000. "International trade with endogenous enforcement of property rights," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 25-54, June.
    8. Claire W. Armstrong & Ussif Rashid Sumaila, 2001. "Optimal Allocation of TAC and the Implications of Implementing an ITQ Management System for the North-East Arctic Cod," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(3), pages 350-359.
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