Collective Values, Behavioural Norms and Rules Building Institutions for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction
Economic growth and poverty reduction require for a country to establish efficient rules for economic and political transactions. Poor countries suffer from inadequate, inefficient transaction rules. Formal rules (e.g.,laws,policies) must be nested in hospitable behavioural norms and values. Cultural collectivism in many of these countries and consequent group-oriented values, factionalism, and discretionary rule implementation have adverse implications for their efforts to establish well-defined property rights and other rules. Overtime, these countries must establish rules for government-enforced, widespread impersonal transactions. [DiscussionPaperNo.2001/98]
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