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Group-Oriented Values, Rules and Cooperation

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  • Ke-Young Chu

Abstract

This paper uses a game-theoretic framework to explain how collectivist values hamper societies' efforts to elicit cooperation in inter-group games of prisoners' dilemma (PD) and draws on the results of the analysis to interpret the meanings of three historical institutional reform episodes. Group-oriented values, widespread throughout non-western civilizations, can contribute to social cohesion, but tend to cause inter-group conflicts within a country.

Suggested Citation

  • Ke-Young Chu, 2004. "Group-Oriented Values, Rules and Cooperation," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2004-66, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:rp2004-66
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    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/rp2004-066.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ke-Young Chu, 2004. "A Model of a Rule of Law and a Rule of Man: Implications for the Design of Institutions," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2004-65, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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