Fiscal Federalism, State Lobbying and Discretionary Finance in India
The paper attempts to construct political influence variables and explain discrepancies in fund disbursement through proper econometric specification in the Indian context.
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- Indira Rajaraman, 2007. "The Political Economy of the Indian Fiscal Federation," India Policy Forum, Global Economy and Development Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 4(1), pages 1-51.
- Maddala, G S, 1971. "The Use of Variance Components Models in Pooling Cross Section and Time Series Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(2), pages 341-58, March.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1998. "Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 153-180, May.
- Pincus, J J, 1975. "Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 757-78, August.
- Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
- Brunetti, Aymo, 1997. " Political Variables in Cross-Country Growth Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(2), pages 163-90, June.
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