Evolution of Spontaneous Social Exchange - An Experimental Study -
Each of several exchange partners is the monopoly owner of a specific commodity which she can share with others. It is optimal to keep the own endowment, but all would gain by mutual gift exchange. Participants play the game repeatedly in constant groups (partner design) and can establish stable exchange relations over time. Will they include all group members, as suggested by efficiency, will early exploiters be permanently isolated (ostracism) and will groups become more efficient over time? To answer these questions the game is repeated once with a new group. We also vary the group size.
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