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Fiscal integration in the Eurozone: economic effects of two key scenarios

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  • Dolls, Mathias
  • Fuest, Clemens
  • Neumann, Dirk
  • Peichl, Andreas

Abstract

The 2008-09 crisis has shown that some euro area member countries were unable to sufficiently stabilize their economies which has given rise to a debate about deeper fiscal integration in Europe. In this paper, we analyze the redistributive and stabilizing effects of two scenarios of fiscal integration in the Eurozone, namely the introduction of i) a joint tax and transfer system that replaces 10 per cent of national systems and ii) a system of fiscal equalization that equalizes 10 per cent of differences in taxing capacity. Based on the European tax-benefit calculator EUROMOD and representative household micro data for the current 17 euro area member states, our conceptual experiment shows that a joint tax and transfer system would only lead to moderate gains in terms of stabilization while redistribution would flow especially towards the Eastern European member states. In contrast, a fiscal equalization mechanism that redistributes revenues across countries could even lead to destabilizing effects.
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Suggested Citation

  • Dolls, Mathias & Fuest, Clemens & Neumann, Dirk & Peichl, Andreas, 2014. "Fiscal integration in the Eurozone: economic effects of two key scenarios," EUROMOD Working Papers EM1/14, EUROMOD at the Institute for Social and Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:ese:emodwp:em1-14
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    File URL: https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/publications/working-papers/euromod/em1-14.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dolls, Mathias & Fuest, Clemens & Peichl, Andreas, 2012. "Automatic stabilizers and economic crisis: US vs. Europe," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 279-294.
    2. Buettner, Thiess, 2006. "The incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on tax policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 477-497, February.
    3. Bertola, Giuseppe, 2013. "Policy Coordination, Convergence, and the Rise and Crisis of EMU Imbalances," CEPR Discussion Papers 9471, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Michael D. Bordo & Lars Jonung & Agnieszka Markiewicz, 2013. "A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 59(3), pages 449-488, September.
    5. Emmanuel Farhi & Iván Werning, 2017. "Fiscal Unions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(12), pages 3788-3834, December.
    6. Olivier Bargain & Mathias Dolls & Clemens Fuest & Dirk Neumann & Andreas Peichl & Nico Pestel & Sebastian Siegloch, 2013. "Fiscal union in Europe? Redistributive and stabilizing effects of a European tax-benefit system and fiscal equalization mechanism," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 28(75), pages 375-422, July.
    7. Holly Sutherland & Francesco Figari, 2013. "EUROMOD: the European Union tax-benefit microsimulation model," International Journal of Microsimulation, International Microsimulation Association, vol. 1(6), pages 4-26.
    8. Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel R. Feenberg, 2000. "The Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 37-56, Summer.
    9. Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, 2012. "European Fiscal Union: What Is It? Does It work? And Are There Really 'No Alternatives'?," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(1), pages 03-09, April.
    10. Philipp Engler & Simon Voigts, 2013. "A Transfer Mechanism for a Monetary Union," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2013-013, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    11. Evers, Michael P., 2012. "Federal fiscal transfer rules in monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 507-525.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Étienne Farvaque & Florence Huart, 2016. "Drowned by Numbers? Designing an EU-wide Unemployment Insurance," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-33, CIRANO.
    2. Etienne Farvaque & Florence Huart, 2017. "A policymaker’s guide to a Euro area stabilization fund," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(1), pages 11-30, April.
    3. Dolls, Mathias & Fuest, Clemens & Neumann, Dirk & Peichl, Andreas, 2014. "An Unemployment Insurance Scheme for the Euro Area," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100572, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Hebous, Shafik & Weichenrieder, Alfons J., 2015. "On deficits and symmetries in a fiscal capacity," SAFE Working Paper Series 112, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
    5. Dolls, Mathias & Fuest, Clemens & Heinemann, Friedrich & Peichl, Andreas, 2015. "Reconciling insurance with market discipline: A blueprint for a European fiscal union," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-044, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Jakob Korbinian Eberl, 2016. "The Collateral Framework of the Eurosystem and Its Fiscal Implications," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 69.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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