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Import tariffs and export subsidies in the World Trade Organization: A small-country approach

  • Tanapong Potipiti

    (Chulalongkorn University)

This paper develops a simple small-country model to explain why the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibits export subsidies but allows import tariffs

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File URL: http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/wp11912.pdf
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Paper provided by Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT), an initiative of UNESCAP and IDRC, Canada. in its series Working Papers with number 11912.

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Date of creation: Aug 2012
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Publication status: Published in ARTNeT website
Handle: RePEc:esc:wpaper:11912
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/

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  1. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and asymmetric lobbying: why governments pick losers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19726, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  2. J. Bradford Jensen & Andrew B Bernard, 2002. "The Deaths of Manufacturing Plants," Working Papers 02-15, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
  3. Subramanian, Arvind & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2007. "The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 151-175, May.
  4. Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 2005. "A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 11716, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. John R. Baldwin & Wulong Gu, 2004. "Trade Liberalization: Export-market Participation, Productivity Growth, and Innovation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(3), pages 372-392, Autumn.
  6. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
  7. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000. "Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes," NBER Working Papers 7822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Wilfred J. Ethier, 2002. "Trade Agreements Based on Political Externalities, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-035, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 Nov 2003.
  9. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-37, December.
  10. Levy, Philip I., 1999. "Lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 345-370, April.
  11. Glismann, Hans H. & Weiss, Frank Dietmar, 1980. "On the political economy of protection in Germany," Kiel Working Papers 113, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  12. Aaron Tornell, 1991. "Time Inconsistency of Protectionist Programs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(3), pages 963-974.
  13. Grossman,G.M. & Helpman,E., 1995. "Rent Dissipation, Free Riding, and Trade Policy," Papers 31-95, Tel Aviv.
  14. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
  15. Robert C. Feenstra & John Romalis & Peter K. Schott, 2002. "U.S. Imports, Exports, and Tariff Data, 1989-2001," NBER Working Papers 9387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Mitra, Devashish, 2002. "Endogenous political organization and the value of trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 473-485, August.
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