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Import tariffs and export subsidies in the World Trade Organization: A small-country approach


  • Tanapong Potipiti

    (Chulalongkorn University)


This paper develops a simple small-country model to explain why the World Trade Organization (WTO) prohibits export subsidies but allows import tariffs

Suggested Citation

  • Tanapong Potipiti, 2012. "Import tariffs and export subsidies in the World Trade Organization: A small-country approach," Working Papers 11912, Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT), an initiative of UNESCAP and IDRC, Canada..
  • Handle: RePEc:esc:wpaper:11912

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2001. "Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 113-128, July.
    2. John R. Baldwin & Wulong Gu, 2004. "Trade Liberalization: Export-market Participation, Productivity Growth, and Innovation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(3), pages 372-392, Autumn.
    3. Andrew B. Bernard & J. Bradford Jensen, 2002. "The Deaths of Manufacturing Plants," NBER Working Papers 9026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Subramanian, Arvind & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2007. "The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 151-175, May.
    5. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
    6. Aaron Tornell, 1991. "Time Inconsistency of Protectionist Programs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(3), pages 963-974.
    7. Glismann, Hans H. & Weiss, Frank Dietmar, 1980. "On the political economy of protection in Germany," Kiel Working Papers 113, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    8. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    9. Mitra, Devashish, 2002. "Endogenous political organization and the value of trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 473-485, August.
    10. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-837, December.
    11. Robert C. Feenstra & John Romalis & Peter K. Schott, 2002. "U.S. Imports, Exports, and Tariff Data, 1989-2001," NBER Working Papers 9387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Levy, Philip I., 1999. "Lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 345-370, April.
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    More about this item


    Export subsidy agreement; import tariff; WTO;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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