IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eps/cepswp/13212.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Blueprint for Completing the Banking Union

Author

Listed:
  • Micossi, Stefano

Abstract

Completing the banking union is an urgent project facing the EU, given the eurozone’s continued vulnerability to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks to national banking systems. The proposed changes to the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) under consideration by the European Commission could open the way to a satisfactory compromise between the twin needs to reduce legacy risks in banks’ balance sheets and to provide greater risk-sharing and a fiscal backstop for both the Resolution and the EDIS Funds – while continuing to exclude any sharing of past losses. With such a compromise, financial fragmentation would likely recede rapidly, leading to a larger role by private capital in cushioning real and financial idiosyncratic shocks. EDIS could move forward immediately by providing in its early phase that the European Stability Mechanism would provide a liquidity line to national deposit guarantee schemes that had exhausted their funds, with no sharing of losses. Meanwhile, risk-reduction would accelerate through the stronger policies already established by the Single Supervisory Mechanism for the reduction of non-performing loans and a fresh approach to the reduction of banks’ sovereign exposures, based on a modified version of the large exposure prudential policy. Direct risk-weighting of national sovereigns would be excluded. The ultimate anchor of a stable banking union would be credible policies to reduce excessive sovereign debt-to-GDP ratios. This paper argues that a combination of a strengthened debt rule in the Stability and Growth Pact and a market discipline mechanism entailing the obligation to issue junior bonds, subject to restructuring, for the countries violating the common budgetary rules, could offer a suitable way forward to restore the credibility of the Pact. It also argues that effective policy coordination within the eurozone also requires greater symmetry of policy obligations by the member states, which may be built into the European Semester through an appropriate revision of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure.

Suggested Citation

  • Micossi, Stefano, 2017. "A Blueprint for Completing the Banking Union," CEPS Papers 13212, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:13212
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PI_2017_42_SM_BlueprintCompletingBU.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul De Grauwe, 2014. "The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Exchange Rates and Global Financial Policies, chapter 12, pages 297-320, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Gros, Daniel, 2013. "Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus: The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area," CEPS Papers 7904, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    3. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2017. "ESBies: safety in the tranches," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(90), pages 175-219.
    4. Daniel Gros, 2013. "Banking union with a sovereign virus," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 48(2), pages 93-97, March.
    5. Andreja Lenarčič & Dirk Mevis & Dóra Siklós, 2016. "Tackling sovereign risk in European banks," Discussion Papers 1, European Stability Mechanism.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Canofari & Alessandra Marcelletti & Marcello Messori, 2020. "Redenomination Risk and Bank Runs in a Monetary Union with and Without Deposit Insurance Schemes," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 237-256, April.
    2. Francesco Spadafora, 2020. "Completing the Economic and Monetary Union: Wisdom Come Late?," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 6(3), pages 379-409, November.
    3. Pierpaolo Benigno & Paolo Canofari & Giovanni Bartolomeo & Marcello Messori, 2024. "The Spectre of Financial Dominance in the Eurozone," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 10(1), pages 59-80, March.
    4. Francesco Spadafora, 2019. "European integration in the time of mistrust," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 512, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Pierpaolo Benigno & Paolo Canofari & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Marcello Messori, 2021. "Financial Dominance in the Pandemic and Post-Pandemic European Economy," Working Papers in Public Economics 206, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
    6. Micossi, Stefano & Peirce, Fabrizia, 2020. "Overcoming the gridlock in EMU decision-making," CEPS Papers 26688, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    7. Goodhart, C. A. E. & Sato, Hideki, 2024. "A note on the differences between European and international methodologies of banking regulation and supervision," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 122044, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Eleonora Cutrini & Giorgio Galeazzi, 2017. "External Public Debt, Trade Linkages and Contagion During the Eurozone Crisis," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(9), pages 1718-1749, September.
    2. van Riet, Ad, 2016. "Government Funding Privileges in European Financial Law : Making Public Debt Everybody's Favourite?," Other publications TiSEM b1290139-3e4e-4a2d-a783-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Eleonora Cutrini and Giorgio Galeazzi, 2014. "Contagion in the Euro crisis: capital flows and trade linkages," Working Papers 44-2014, Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE), revised Nov 2014.
    4. Jack Bekooij & Jon Frost & Remco van der Molen & Krzysztof Muzalewski, 2016. "Hazardous tango: Sovereign-bank interdependencies across countries and time," DNB Working Papers 541, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    5. Coimbra, Nuno, 2020. "Sovereigns at risk: A dynamic model of sovereign debt and banking leverage," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    6. Dragos G. TURLIUC & Andreea N. POPOVICI, 2013. "TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION-Literature review," SEA - Practical Application of Science, Romanian Foundation for Business Intelligence, Editorial Department, issue 1, pages 221-229, June.
    7. Spyros Alogoskoufis & Sam Langfield, 2020. "Regulating the Doom Loop," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(4), pages 251-292, September.
    8. De Groen, Willem Pieter, 2015. "The ECB�s QE: Time to break the doom loop between banks and their governments," CEPS Papers 10299, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    9. Panizza, Ugo & Fatás, Antonio & Ghosh, Atish R. & ,, 2019. "The Motives to Borrow," CEPR Discussion Papers 13735, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Paolo Angelini & Giuseppe Grande & Fabio Panetta, 2014. "The negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 213, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    11. Gianluca Cafiso, 2014. "Debt Sustainability in the Case of External Debt. An Analysis Based on Italy's Treasury Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5021, CESifo.
    12. Christophe Destais & Frederik Eidam & Friedrich Heinemann, 2019. "The design of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism for the euro area: Choices and trade-offs," EconPol Policy Reports 11, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    13. Fabrizio Balassone & Sara Cecchetti & Martina Cecioni & Marika Cioffi & Wanda Cornacchia & Flavia Corneli & Gabriele Semeraro, 2016. "Risk Reduction and Risk Sharing in the Governance of the Euro Area," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 463-488.
    14. Athanasios Orphanides, 2020. "The fiscal–monetary policy mix in the euro area: challenges at the zero lower bound," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 35(103), pages 461-517.
    15. De Grauwe Paul & Ji Yuemei, 2018. "Core-Periphery Relations in the Eurozone," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-15, December.
    16. Gomez-Puig, Marta & Singh, Manish K. & Sosvilla-Rivero, Simon, 2019. "The sovereign-bank nexus in peripheral euro area: Further evidence from contingent claims analysis," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-26.
    17. De Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei, 2019. "Making the Eurozone sustainable by financial engineering or political union," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102045, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    18. van Riet, Ad, 2017. "Addressing the safety trilemma: a safe sovereign asset for the eurozone," ESRB Working Paper Series 35, European Systemic Risk Board.
    19. Gianluca Cafiso, 2013. "Public-Debt Financing in the case of External Debt," Working Papers 2013-37, CEPII research center.
    20. repec:cmj:journl:y:2013:i:27:turliucd,popovicia is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Kathrin Berensmann & Florence Dafe & Ulrich Volz, 2015. "Developing local currency bond markets for long-term development financing in Sub-Saharan Africa," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 31(3-4), pages 350-378.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:13212. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Margarita Minkova (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cepssbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.