Informal Contracts in Transition Economies: A Dynamic Approach
In a transition economy, many of employee/employer's contracts are informal, rather than formal. Even in cases when formal contracts concluded, external legal enforcement of a contract often appears to be imperfect and costly. Sometimes, this brings to the employer the opportunity to 'deceive' the employee, paying him a lower salary than he had expected ex-ante. Underdevelopment of the judiciary system and weak enforcement of courts decisions make this problem more serious, and at the same time more difficult to resolve. The current paper provides a positive model of deception at labor markets.
|Date of creation:||01 Jul 2003|
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