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Establishing Cooperation between Groups: Ingroup versus Outgroup Punishment

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  • Christian Stoff

Abstract

We analyse interethnic cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner�s dilemma when members of one group are unable to target punishment towards individual defectors from the other group. We first show that indiscriminate punishment may sustain cooperation in this setting. Our main result, however, is that the introduction of ingroup punishment in addition to outgroup punishment represents a better sanctioning institution in the sense that cooperative outcomes may persist in situations where outgroup punishment alone fails to induce cooperation. Our findings are consistent with historical evidence on the dynamics of interethnic conflicts.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Stoff, 2004. "Establishing Cooperation between Groups: Ingroup versus Outgroup Punishment," SOI - Working Papers 0416, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Feb 2006.
  • Handle: RePEc:soz:wpaper:0416
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    File URL: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp_soi/wp0416.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    conflicts; interethnic cooperation; ethnicity; intergroup relations; ingroup punishment; outgroup punishment;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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