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Debt Stabilisation Bias And The Taylor Principle: Optimal Policy In A New Keynesian Model With Government Debt And Inflation Persistence

  • Svan Jari Stehn

    ()

  • David Vines

    ()

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    Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) have shown that government debt is returned to its pre-shock level in a New Keynesian model under optimal discretionary policy. This has two important implications for monetary and fiscal policy. First, in a high-debt economy, it may be optimal for discretionary monetary policy to cut the interest rate in response to a cost-push shock - thereby violating the Taylor principle - although this will not be true if inflation is significantly persistent. Second, the optimal fiscal response to such a shock is more active under discretion than commitment, whatever the degree of inflation persistence.

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    File URL: http://cbe.anu.edu.au/research/papers/camawpapers/Papers/2007/Stehn_Vines_222007.pdf
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    Paper provided by Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University in its series CAMA Working Papers with number 2007-22.

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    Length: 35 pages
    Date of creation: Oct 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2007-22
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    1. Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie & Uribe, Martín, 2004. "Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 4334, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    5. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 64, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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    7. Mehra Yash P, 2004. "The Output Gap, Expected Future Inflation and Inflation Dynamics: Another Look," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-19, December.
    8. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," NBER Working Papers 7147, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Tatiana Kirsanova & Simon Wren‐Lewis, 2012. "Optimal Fiscal Feedback on Debt in an Economy with Nominal Rigidities," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(559), pages 238-264, 03.
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    14. Troy A. Davig & Eric M. Leeper, 2005. "Generalizing the Taylor principle," Research Working Paper RWP 05-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    15. Soderlind, Paul, 1999. "Solution and estimation of RE macromodels with optimal policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 813-823, April.
    16. Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-lewis, 2006. "Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model," WEF Working Papers 0006, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
    17. Leeper, Eric M., 1991. "Equilibria under 'active' and 'passive' monetary and fiscal policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 129-147, February.
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    19. Julio Rotemberg & Michael Woodford, 1997. "An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, Volume 12, pages 297-361 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    22. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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