Forbearance in Optimal Multilateral Trade Agreements
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- T. Renee Bowen & George Georgiadis & Nicolas S. Lambert, 2019.
"Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision,"
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- T. Renee Bowen & George Georgiadis & Nicolas S. Lambert, 2016. "Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision," NBER Working Papers 22772, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bowen, T. Renee & Georgiadis, George & Lambert, Nicolas, 2016. "Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision," CEPR Discussion Papers 11602, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bowen, T. Renee & Georgiadis, George & Lambert, Nicolas S., 2015.
"Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision: Real versus Formal Authority,"
Research Papers
3346, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Nicolas Lambert & George Georgiadis & Renee Bowen, 2016. "Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision: Real versus Formal Authority," 2016 Meeting Papers 197, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mostafa Beshkar, 2016.
"Arbitration and Renegotiation in Trade Agreements,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 586-619.
- Mostafa Beshkar, 2014. "Arbitration and Renegotiation in Trade Agreements," CAEPR Working Papers 2014-004, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Mostafa Beshkar, 2014. "Arbitration and Renegotiation in Trade Agreements," Caepr Working Papers 2014-004, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2011-11-21 (Game Theory)
- NEP-INT-2011-11-21 (International Trade)
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