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Migratory policy in developing countries: how to bring best people back?

This paper analyzes the decision of a migrant to return or stay within the framework of a signaling model with exogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and good workers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers. Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to the perfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher the incentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow

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Paper provided by ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School in its series ESSEC Working Papers with number DR 08017.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-08017
Contact details of provider: Postal: ESSEC Research Center, BP 105, 95021 Cergy, France
Web page: http://www.essec.edu/
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  1. Christian Dustmann & Yoram Weiss, 2007. "Return Migration: Theory and Empirical Evidence," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 0702, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London.
  2. Christian Dustmann & Yoram Weiss, 2007. "Return Migration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 45(2), pages 236-256, 06.
  3. Augustin De Coulon & Matloob Piracha, 2003. "Self-selection and the performance of return migrants: the source country perspective," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20040, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  4. Borjas, George J & Bratsberg, Bernt, 1996. "Who Leaves? The Outmigration of the Foreign-Born," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 78(1), pages 165-76, February.
  5. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  6. Ali Mansoor & Bryce Quillin, 2007. "Migration and Remittances : Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 6920.
  7. Alice Mesnard, 2004. "Temporary migration and capital market imperfections," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 242-262, April.
  8. Katz, Eliakim & Stark, Oded, 1987. "Migration, information and the costs and benefits of signalling," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 323-331, August.
  9. Dustmann, Christian, 2000. "Temporary Migration and Economic Assimilation," IZA Discussion Papers 186, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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