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Le choix de la forme organisationnelle en matière d’investissement en R&D à l’étranger par les firmes multinationales:la contribution de la théorie des coûts de transaction; The choice of an R&D organizational form by multinational firms:the transaction costs theory contribution

Author

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  • Dhikra Chebbi Nehkili

    (Université de Bourgogne (LEG/FARGO))

Abstract

(VF)L’objectif de ce papier est d’expliquer le choix du mode de gouvernance des activités de R&D à l’étranger à travers la contribution de la théorie des coûts de transaction. Nous avons identifié principalement trois grandes formes organisationnelles en matière d’investissement en R&D à l’étranger : l’internalisation totale, les alliances en R&D et l’externalisation totale par le biais des licences unilatérales. Nous avons classé les déterminants du choix organisationnel en deux groupes : les déterminants comportementaux (opportunisme et rationalité limitée) et les déterminants liés aux caractéristiques des transactions (spécificité, incertitude, fréquence). Suite à une étude quantitative par le biais d’un questionnaire diffusé au prés de 769 firmes multinationales, nos principaux résultats montrent que le choix de l’internalisation des activités de R&D est favorisé en cas d’opportunisme des agents et de fréquence élevée des transactions, le choix des licences unilatérales est défavorisé en cas de rationalité limitée, de spécificité des activités de R&D et d’incertitude technologique et le choix des alliances est favorisé en cas d’incertitude commerciale.(VA)The objective of this paper is to explain the choice of the governance mode of R&D activities abroad through the contribution of the transaction costs theory. We identified three main organizational forms: the complete internalization, the R&D alliances, and the complete externalization by the unilateral licensing agreements. We have classified the organizational choice determinants into two groups: the behavioral determinants (opportunistic behavior and bounded rationality) and the transactional determinants (specificity, uncertainty and frequency). We conducted a quantitative study through a questionnaire sent to 769 multinational firms. Our main results show that the R&D internalization is chosen in case of opportunistic behavior and a high frequency of the R&D transactions, the unilateral licensing agreements are underprivileged in case of bounded rationality, specific character of the R&D activities and technological uncertainty and the R&D alliances are chosen in case of commercial uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Dhikra Chebbi Nehkili, 2007. "Le choix de la forme organisationnelle en matière d’investissement en R&D à l’étranger par les firmes multinationales:la contribution de la théorie des coûts de transaction; The choice of an R&D organ," Working Papers CREGO 1071001, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1071001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    formes organisationnelles; théorie des coûts de transaction; R&D; firmes multinationales; organizational forms; transaction costs theory; R&D; multinational firms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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