Optimal Technology Policy with Imitation and Risk-Averting Households
A Schumpeterian growth model is constructed where R&D firms innovate to produce better versions of the products or imitate to copy existing innovations. Because firms cannot use their innovations or imitations as collateral, they finance their investment by issuing shares. Households save by purchasing these shares. The government affects the level of profits through competition policy. The main findings are the following. A small imitation subsidy slows down growth. In the first-best optimum collusion is socially optimal, but when the government cannot discriminate between innovation and imitation, it should promote product market competition.
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