Competition, Imitation and Growth with Non-Diversifiable Risk
This paper analyzes the growth and welfare effects of competition in an endogenously-growing economy with imitation and non-diversifiable risk. The main findings are as follows. There is no imitation without positive profits during innovation races. A larger proportion of competing industries leads to slower economic growth. When competitive profits are high or low, the economy grows faster than when they are of medium size. If the government subsidizes innovation and imitation optimally, then competitive profits are positively associated with welfare. With an optimal uniform subsidy to all R&D, there is an “inverted-U” relationship between competitive profits and welfare.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2006|
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- Aghion, Philippe & Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1997. "Competition and growth with step-by-step innovation: An example," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 771-782, April.
- Cheng, Leonard K & Tao, Zhigang, 1999. "The Impact of Public Policies on Innovation and Imitation: The Role of R&D Technology in Growth Models," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 187-207, February.
- Walde, Klaus, 1999. "A Model of Creative Destruction with Undiversifiable Risk and Optimising Households," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C156-71, March.
- Segerstrom, Paul S, 1998. "Endogenous Growth without Scale Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1290-1310, December.
- Vesa Kanniainen & Rune Stenbacka, 2000. "Endogenous Imitation and Implications for Technology Policy," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(2), pages 360-, June.
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