The Uses, Value and Limitation of Game Theoretic Methods in Defense Analysis
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References listed on IDEAS
- Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1985. "Experimental Economics: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 264-272, March.
- Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Deterrence and cooperation : A classification of two-person games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 179-193.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 1985. "Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, No.39 (1986),pp.176-188.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 109, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
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- repec:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:177-189 is not listed on IDEAS
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KeywordsGame theory; war; national defense;
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