Game Theory. Models of Strategic Behavior and Nuclear Deterrence
This essay offers an exposition of the potential uses of game theoretic reasoning and mathematical models in the study of the prevention of nuclear war.
|Date of creation:||Mar 1987|
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"Games with Incomplete Information,"
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- Martin Shubik & Robert J. Weber, 1978. "Competitive Valuation of Cooperative Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 482, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
- Quint, Thomas & Shubik, Martin, 2001. " Games of Status," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 349-72.
- Martin Shubik & Robert J. Weber, 1978. "Systems Defense Games: Colonel Blotto, Command and Control," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 489, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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