Game Theory. Models of Strategic Behavior and Nuclear Deterrence
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References listed on IDEAS
- Martin Shubik & Robert J. Weber, 1978. "Systems Defense Games: Colonel Blotto, Command and Control," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 489, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
- Quint, Thomas & Shubik, Martin, 2001. " Games of Status," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 349-372.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986.
"Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma,"
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Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1639, David K. Levine.
- Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
- Martin Shubik & Robert J. Weber, 1978. "Competitive Valuation of Cooperative Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 482, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
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KeywordsGame theory; nuclear deterrence; arms race; escalation; retaliation; threat;
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