Game Theory, Complexity and Simplicity. Part III: Critique and Prospective
A discussion of some of the problems in the utilization of game theoretic solution concepts is given. It is suggested that a considerable broadening of solution concepts is called for to take into account sufficient context. Mass agent simulations appear to offer promise for some economic and societal problems.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Complexity (1998), 3(5): 34-46|
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