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The Uses, Value and Limitations of Game Theoretic Methods in Defence Analysis

In: Peace, Defence and Economic Analysis

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  • M. Shubik

    (Yale University)

Abstract

An overview of the applications of the theory of games to defence analysis is given. The important distinction is made between those models of conflict which can be adequately modelled as two-person constant-sum games and those which model as non-constant-sum games with two or more players.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Shubik, 1987. "The Uses, Value and Limitations of Game Theoretic Methods in Defence Analysis," International Economic Association Series, in: Christian Schmidt & Frank Blackaby (ed.), Peace, Defence and Economic Analysis, chapter 4, pages 53-84, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-18898-7_4
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-18898-7_4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    3. Norman C. Dalkey, 1965. "Solvable Nuclear War Models," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 11(9), pages 783-791, July.
    4. Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Deterrence and cooperation : A classification of two-person games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 179-193.
    5. Smith, Vernon L, 1985. "Experimental Economics: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 264-272, March.
    6. Ariel Rubinstein, 1985. "Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, No.39 (1986),pp.176-188.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 109, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    7. Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, 1948. "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56, pages 279-279.
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    Cited by:

    1. Isard Walter & Anderton Charles H., 1999. "Survey of the Peace Economics Literature: Recent Key Contributions and a Comprehensive Coverage Up to 1992 (Part II)," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(4), pages 1-55, October.
    2. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2017. "Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: The impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 177-189.

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