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Intra-household Welfare

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Abstract

In this paper we develop an approach to measuring inequality and poverty that recognizes the fact that individuals within households may have both different preferences and differential access to resources. We argue that a measure based on estimates of the sharing rule is inadequate as an approach that seeks to understand how welfare is distributed in the population because it ignores public good and the allocation of time to market work, leisure and household production. We develop a money metric measure of welfare that accounts for public goods (by using personalized prices) household production and for the allocation of time.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Costas Meghir, 2014. "Intra-household Welfare," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1949, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1949
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d19/d1949.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Frederic Vermeulen & Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Maria-Concetta Chiuri & François Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck & , 2006. "Collective Models of Labor Supply with Nonconvex Budget Sets and Nonparticipation: A Calibration Approach," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 113-127, June.
    2. Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Marie-Concetta Chiuri & Francois Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck & Javier Ruiz-Castillo , 2006. "Does the representation of the household behavior matter for welfare analysis of tax-benefit policies ?," Post-Print hal-00279212, HAL.
    3. Laurens Cherchye & Bram De Rock & Arthur Lewbel & Frederic Vermeulen, 2015. "Sharing Rule Identification for General Collective Consumption Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(5), pages 2001-2041, September.
    4. Kaushik Basu, 2006. "Gender and Say: a Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously Determined Balance of Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(511), pages 558-580, April.
    5. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    6. Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Maria-Concetta Chiuri & François Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck & Javier Ruiz-Castillo , 2006. "Does the Representation of Household Behavior Matter for Welfare Analysis of Tax-benefit Policies? An Introduction," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 99-111, June.
    7. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
    8. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2001. "Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 347-368.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aaberge, Rolf & Colombino, Ugo & Perali, Federico, 2015. "A Centralized Approach to Modelling Collective Household Decisions: some preliminary results," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201505, University of Turin.
    2. Jean-Paul Chavas & Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2021. "Bargaining in the Family," CHILD Working Papers Series 88 JEL Classification: D1, Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD) - CCA.
    3. Cherchye, Laurens & Cosaert, Sam & De Rock, Bram & Kerstens, Pieter Jan & Vermeulen, Frederic, 2018. "Individual welfare analysis for collective households," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 98-114.
    4. Olivier Bargain & Guy Lacroix & Luca Tiberti, 2018. "Validating the collective model of household consumption using direct evidence on sharing," Working Papers PMMA 2018-06, PEP-PMMA.
    5. Olivier Bargain, 2017. "Welfare analysis and redistributive policies," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 15(4), pages 393-419, December.
    6. Jean-Paul Chavas & Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2022. "(In)Efficient Bargaining in the Family," Working Papers 2, SITES.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Family economics; Collective models; Labor supply; Income distribution; Home production;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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