Impartiality and Priority. Part 2: A Characterization with Solidarity
The ethic of 'priority' is a compromise between the extremely compensatory ethic of 'welfare equality' and the needs-blind ethic of ‘income equality’. We propose an axiom of priority, and characterize resource allocation rules that are impartial, prioritarian, and solidaristic. They comprise a class of rules which equalize across individuals some index of resources and welfare. Consequently, we provide an ethical rationalization for the many applications in which such indices have been used (e.g., the 'human development index,' 'index of primary goods,' etc.).
|Date of creation:||Aug 2004|
|Date of revision:||May 2005|
|Publication status:||Published in Econometrica (2006), 27(5): 311-325|
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- Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2001. " Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 167-184.
- EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2003.
"Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems,"
Cahiers de recherche
2003-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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- Juan Moreno-Ternero & John E. Roemer, 2004. "Impartiality and Priority. Part 1: The Veil of Ignorance," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1477A, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2005.
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2004. "Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(4), pages 545-560, 08.
- Keiding, Hans & Moulin, Herve, 1991. "The solidarity axiom in parametric surplus-sharing problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 249-270.
- Hervé Moulin, 1987. "The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(4), pages 769-783.
- Marc Fleurbaey & Francois Maniquet, 1999. "Cooperative production with unequal skills: The solidarity approach to compensation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 569-583.
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