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Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government

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  • Liutang Gong

    (Guanghua School of Management, Peking University
    Institute for Advanced Study, Wuhan University)

  • Heng-fu Zou

    (Guanghua School of Management, Peking University
    Institute for Advanced Study, Wuhan University
    Development Research Group, The World Bank)

Abstract

In this paper, we study the optimal choices of the federal income tax, federal transfers, and local taxes in a dynamic model of capital accumulation and with explicit gamestructure s among multipleprivateage nts, multiplelocal governments, and the federal government. In general, the optimal local property tax is zero if the local property tax is constrained to be nonnegative, whereas the optimal local consumption tax is always positive. When the local consumption tax is chosen optimally, the federal income tax can be either positive or negative. For most reasonable parameter values, our numerical calculations have shown that with a positive local consumption tax there exists a reverse transfer from local governments to the federal government.

Suggested Citation

  • Liutang Gong & Heng-fu Zou, 2001. "Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government," CEMA Working Papers 54, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cuf:wpaper:54
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez & Ikuho Kochi & Luis E. Gutiérrez Casas, 2015. "The structure of political power and redistribution in economies with multiple governments," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 30(2), pages 269-303.
    2. Liutang Gong & Heng-fu Zou, 2003. "Fiscal Federalism, Public Capital Formation, and Endogenous Growth," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 4(2), pages 471-490, November.
    3. Yutao Han & Zhen Song, 2017. "On regional integration, fiscal income, and GDP per capita," CEMA Working Papers 600, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
    4. Ramiro Gil-Serrate & Julio López-Laborda, "undated". "Modelling Tax Decentralisation And Regional Growth," Working Papers 14-05 Classification-JEL , Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.
    5. Zou, Heng-fu, 2012. "Optimal design of intergovernmental grants in a dynamic model," MPRA Paper 37427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Liutang Gong & Heng-fu Zou, 1998. "Fiscal Policies in a Finite Horizon Model with the Spirit of Capitalism," CEMA Working Papers 102, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Income tax; Property tax; Consumption tax; Intergovernmental transfers; Capital accumulation; Fiscal federalism;

    JEL classification:

    • E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • O4 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
    • R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis

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