Capital Accumulation And Present-biased Preference
This paper reexamines the capital accumulation within a neo-classical growth model under the assumption of hyperbolic discounting as well as endogenous preference, finding that 1) two kinds of Naifs¡¯ behavior coincides under log utility; 2) increasing marginal impatience due to capital accumulation itself will negatively affect the steady state locus of consumption and capital; 3) the effect of hyperbolic settings through effective rate of preference is still ambiguous; 4) we prove the saddle-point equilibrium property for the steady state under various assumptions about individual¡¯s preference. Our model also justifies Max Weber's idea that although spirit of capitalism is an engine to capital accumulation, the subsequent growing wealth will damage this engine.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://cema.cufe.edu.cn/|
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- David I. Laibson, 1996. "Hyperbolic Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy," NBER Working Papers 5635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Heng-fu Zou, 1995.
"The spirit of capitalism and savings behavior,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 131-143, September.
- Carrillo, Juan D & Mariotti, Thomas, 2000. "Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 529-44, July.
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