Two-sided career concern and financial equilibrium
This brief paper constructs a model of delegated portfolio management in which two agency relationships are characterized. First, a delegation process from investors to fund companies, and second, a delegation from fund companies to fund managers. Career concerns of both agents lead to a churning equilibrium in which uninformed managers trade noisily, and uninformed fund companies are willing to hire these uninformed managers. This equilibrium delivers non-fully informative prices and a positive and high trading volume. Our model then strengths previous explanations to the trade puzzle, predicting an increasing trade activity as long as institutional investors with intense delegation play an increasing role in financial markets.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Dow, James & Gorton, Gary, 1997.
"Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1024-1050, October.
- James Dow & Gary Gorton, "undated". "Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 19-94, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- James Dow & Gary Gorton, 1994. "Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 95-10, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- James Dow & Gary Gorton, 1994. "Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare," NBER Working Papers 4858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
- Judith A. Chevalier & Glenn D. Ellison, 1995. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," NBER Working Papers 5234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chevalier, J. & Ellison, G., 1996. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Working papers 96-3, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Prat, Andrea & Dasgupta, Amil, 2006. "Financial equilibrium with career concerns," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 67-93, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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