Stock Market Manipulation in the Presence of Fund Flows
We study the manipulation of stock market prices by fund managers in the presence of potential future fund flows. As investors will make further investment as long as the asset price is not fully revealing, the informed manager has incentives to prevent the asset value to be revealed too early, in order to maximise the size of fund flows. Hence in the early trading round, the informed manager always buys the asset even when it is overpriced based on her private information, and the uninformed manager follows suit. Subsequently, the informed manager trades based her private information, and the uninformed one trades based on a mixed strategy. The investors' decisions to invest arise endogenously within the model.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dow, James & Gorton, Gary, 1997.
"Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1024-1050, October.
- James Dow & Gary Gorton, "undated". "Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 19-94, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- James Dow & Gary Gorton, 1994. "Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 95-10, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- James Dow & Gary Gorton, 1994. "Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare," NBER Working Papers 4858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John, Kose & Narayanan, Ranga, 1997. "Market Manipulation and the Role of Insider Trading Regulations," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(2), pages 217-247, April.
- Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
- Prat, Andrea & Dasgupta, Amil, 2006. "Financial equilibrium with career concerns," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 67-93, March.
- Franklin Allen & Gary Gorton, 1993. "Churning Bubbles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 813-836.
- Fishman, Michael J & Hagerty, Kathleen M, 1995. "The Mandatory Disclosure of Trades and Market Liquidity," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 637-676. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2013:v:14:i:2:liu:liu:qiu. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Qiang Gao)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.