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La participación bancaria en estructuras con varios grandes accionistas

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  • Casasola, María José
  • Tribo Gine, José Antonio

Abstract

Este trabajo analiza, en primer lugar, las características de la participación de las entidades de crédito en estructuras con varios grandes accionistas. Un segundo aspecto, que es lo más novedoso del artículo, muestra como la participación bancaria en las empresas con varios grandes accionistas puede ser positiva, a diferencia de lo que encuentran otros estudios. En concreto, sólo encontramos una relación negativa entre participación bancaria y rentabilidad de la empresa cuando las entidades de crédito participan junto con otras entidades financieras en la propiedad de las empresas. Sin embargo, cuando los accionistas significativos que les acompañan no son de naturaleza financiera, la relación es positiva. Justificamos este resultado en virtud de la mayor facilidad que tienen las entidades de crédito para formar coaliciones que priman sus intereses sobre los de los accionistas minoritarios en el primer caso, en comparación con el segundo.

Suggested Citation

  • Casasola, María José & Tribo Gine, José Antonio, 2002. "La participación bancaria en estructuras con varios grandes accionistas," DEE - Documentos de Trabajo. Economía de la Empresa. DB db020101, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
  • Handle: RePEc:cte:dbrepe:db020101
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    References listed on IDEAS

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