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Technological Foundations of Political Instability

Author

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  • Sonin, Konstantin
  • Dagaev, Dmitry
  • Lamberova, Natalia
  • Sobolev, Anton

Abstract

There has been a wide-spread belief that elections with a wide franchise following removal of an oppressive dictator lead to establishment of a government that is not vulnerable to mass protest. At the same time, most of the post-World War II non-constitutional exits of recently-installed autocratic leaders were caused by elite coups, rather than popular protests. The recent experience of Egypt, where the democratic post-Mubarak government, a result of the Arab Spring, collapsed after having had almost uninterrupted protests since its first day in office, offers a striking counterexample to both of these patterns. We demonstrate that this is a general phenomenon: the same technological shock, arrival of social media, that makes the incumbent vulnerable, lays foundation for continuous instability of the subsequent democratic government. Our theoretical model, which incorporates protest into a Downsian framework, takes into account specific features of modern protests: the significant role of social media and the absence of the partisan or personalized leadership during popular unrest. Case studies of the Arab countries with and without large-scale protests corroborate our theoretical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Sonin, Konstantin & Dagaev, Dmitry & Lamberova, Natalia & Sobolev, Anton, 2013. "Technological Foundations of Political Instability," CEPR Discussion Papers 9787, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9787
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Camilo García-Jimeno & Angel Iglesias & Pinar Yildirim, 2018. "Women, Rails and Telegraphs: An Empirical Study of Information Diffusion and Collective Action," NBER Working Papers 24495, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arab spring; Autocracy; Collective action; Regime change; Social media;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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