Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Matvos, Gregor & Ostrovsky, Michael, 2010. "Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 90-112, October.
- Giannetti, Mariassunta & Laeven, Luc, 2007. "Pension Reform, Ownership Structure, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Sweden," CEPR Discussion Papers 6489, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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KeywordsBusiness Groups; Corporate Governance; Corporate Law; Emerging Markets; Institutional Investors; Minority Shareholders; Mutual Funds; Shareholder Activism;
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
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