Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect
The pay-as-you-go social security system, burdened by dwindling labour force, can benefit from immigrants, with birth rates that exceed the native-born birth rates. Thus, the social security system effectively provides an incentive to liberalize migration policy through a political-economy mechanism. The paper examines a dynamic political-economy mechanism through which the social security system influences the young decisive voter's attitudes in favour of a more liberal immigration regime. A Markov equilibrium with social security consists of a more liberal migration policy, than a corresponding equilibrium with no social security.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Benhabib, Jess, 1996. "On the political economy of immigration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1737-1743, December.
- Cohen, Alon & Razin, Assaf, 2008.
"The Skill Composition of Immigrants and the Generosity of the Welfare State: Free vs. Policy-Controlled Migration,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7034, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alon Cohen & Assaf Razin, 2008. "The Skill Composition of Immigrants and the Generosity of the Welfare State: Free vs. Policy-Controlled Migration," NBER Working Papers 14459, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lorenzo Forni, 2005. "Social Security as Markov Equilibrium in OLG Models," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(1), pages 178-194, January.
- Ortega, Francesc, 2005. "Immigration quotas and skill upgrading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1841-1863, September.
- Scholten, Ulrich & Thum, Marcel, 1996. "Public Pensions and Immigration Policy in a Democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(3-4), pages 347-61, June.
- Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February.
- Per Krusell & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 1996.
"Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 301-329.
- Krusell, P. & Rios-Rull, J.V., 1993. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," Papers 547, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Edith Sand & Assaf Razin, 2007. "The Political-Economy Positive Role of the Social Security System in Sustaining Immigration (But Not Vice Versa)," NBER Working Papers 13598, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7310. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.