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Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices

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  • Mueller, Holger
  • Giroud, Xavier

Abstract

This paper examines the hypothesis that firms in competitive industries should benefit relatively less from good governance, while firms in non-competitive industries--where lack of competitive pressure fails to enforce discipline on managers--should benefit relatively more. Whether we look at the effects of governance on long-horizon stock returns, firm value, or operating performance, we consistently find the same pattern: The effect is monotonic in the degree of competition, it is small and insignificant in competitive industries, and it is large and significant in non-competitive industries. By implication, the effect of governance (in non-competitive industries) reported in this paper is stronger than what has been previously reported in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003, "GIM") and subsequent work, who document the average effect across all industries. For instance, GIM?s hedge portfolio - provided it only includes firms in non-competitive industries -earns a monthly alpha of 1.47%, which is twice as large as the alpha reported in GIM. The alpha remains large and significant even if the sample period is extended until 2006. We also revisit the argument that investors in the 1990s anticipated the effect of governance, implying that the alpha earned by GIM?s hedge portfolio is likely due to an omitted risk factor. We find that while investors were indeed not surprised on average, they underestimated the effect of governance in non-competitive industries, the very industries in which governance has a significant effect in the first place.

Suggested Citation

  • Mueller, Holger & Giroud, Xavier, 2008. "Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 6974, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6974
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric E. O. Opoku & Isabel K. M. Yan & Kate Hynes, 2020. "Reaching up and reaching out: The impact of competition on firms’ productivity and export decisions," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 69-101, February.
    2. Zhu Zhu & Feifei Lu, 2020. "Family Ownership and Corporate Environmental Responsibility: The Contingent Effect of Venture Capital and Institutional Environment," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-18, June.
    3. Huang, Hsing-Hua & Lee, Han-Hsing, 2013. "Product market competition and credit risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 324-340.
    4. Maya Waisman & Haizhi Wang & Robert Wuebker, 2009. "Delaware incorporation matters for new ventures: evidence from venture capital investment and the going public process," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 213-227, February.
    5. Michaelides, Panayotis G. & Tsionas, Efthymios G. & Konstantakis, Konstantinos N. & Xidonas, Panos, 2019. "The impact of market competition on CEO salary in the US energy sector1," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 32-37.
    6. Jan Bena, 2008. "The Effect of Credit Rationing on the Shape of the Competition-Innovation Relationship," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp377, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; G-index; Product market competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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