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Regional lobbying and Structural funds. Do regional representation offices in Brussels deliver?

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  • Courty, Julie
  • Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés

Abstract

In recent years regional representation offices have proliferated in Brussels. Among the many aims of these offices are influencing the allocation and securing the transfer of European Structural and Cohesion funds to their respective regions. However, our knowledge about whether they have succeeded in this goal is limited. In this paper we assess the extent to which regional offices in Brussels have managed to affect the territorial commitment and payment of Structural and Cohesion funds for regional development beyond the main officially stated economic criteria of eligibility. The paper uses a custom-made survey of regional offices in Brussels, complemented by economic, institutional, and political data involving factors that should determine how much money is channelled to and disbursed in each region. The results of the Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variable analyses for a total of 123 regions over the period 2009-2013 highlight that the capacity - proxied by the budget and staff of the office - of the regional representation offices to influence the commitment and payment of Structural and Cohesion funds has been negligible, when not outright negative. Regional lobbying in Brussels does not lead to more funds or to an easier disbursement of regional development funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Courty, Julie & Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés, 2018. "Regional lobbying and Structural funds. Do regional representation offices in Brussels deliver?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12725
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Enrique Garcilazo, 2015. "Quality of Government and the Returns of Investment: Examining the Impact of Cohesion Expenditure in European Regions," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(8), pages 1274-1290, August.
    2. Bodenstein, Thilo and Achim Kemmerling, 2012. "Ripples in a rising tide: Why some EU regions receive more structural funds than others," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 16, January.
    3. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
    4. Andres RodrIguez-Pose & Ugo Fratesi†, 2004. "Between Development and Social Policies: The Impact of European Structural Funds in Objective 1 Regions," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(1), pages 97-113.
    5. Florence Bouvet & Sandy Dall'Erba, 2010. "European Regional Structural Funds: How Large is the Influence of Politics on the Allocation Process?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48, pages 501-528, June.
    6. Achim Kemmerling & Thilo Bodenstein, 2006. "Partisan Politics in Regional Redistribution," European Union Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 373-392, September.
    7. Adam William Chalmers, 2013. "Regional Authority, Transnational Lobbying and the Allocation of Structural Funds in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(5), pages 815-831, September.
    8. Nicholas Charron & Lewis Dijkstra & Victor Lapuente, 2014. "Regional Governance Matters: Quality of Government within European Union Member States," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(1), pages 68-90, January.
    9. Lisa Maria Dellmuth & Michael F Stoffel, 2012. "Distributive politics and intergovernmental transfers: The local allocation of European Union structural funds," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(3), pages 413-433, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EU; European regional development policy; Lobbying; regional offices; regional representation; Structural funds;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy

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