IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/11406.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

When Do Laws and Institutions Affect Recovery Rates on Collateral?

Author

Listed:
  • Ioannidou, Vasso
  • Degryse, Hans
  • Liberti, Jose Maria
  • Sturgess, Jason

Abstract

We examine how law and institutions affect banks’ expected recovery rates on collateral using a novel dataset of secured loans made by a single bank across 16 countries, which includes a detailed description of the underlying assets pledged as collateral and the bank’s ex-ante appraised liquidation value. On average, expected recovery rates are higher where laws and institutions grant creditors stronger enforcement rights and bargaining power in the event of default. Using within-borrower estimation to compare recovery rates on different assets for the same borrower, we find that movable collateral that is less redeployable, more susceptible to agency problems, or faster to depreciate exhibits recovery rates that are lower and more vulnerable to laws and institutions. Further, the bank compensates for lower recovery rates in economies with weak performance by charging higher interest rates. The results shed light on one of the underlying economic channels through which weak laws and institutions undermine countries’ financial and economic development.

Suggested Citation

  • Ioannidou, Vasso & Degryse, Hans & Liberti, Jose Maria & Sturgess, Jason, 2016. "When Do Laws and Institutions Affect Recovery Rates on Collateral?," CEPR Discussion Papers 11406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11406
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP11406
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pagano, Marco & Jappelli, Tullio, 1993. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1693-1718, December.
    2. Efraim Benmelech & Mark J. Garmaise & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2005. "Do Liquidation Values Affect Financial Contracts? Evidence from Commercial Loan Contracts and Zoning Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(3), pages 1121-1154.
    3. Williamson, Oliver E, 1988. " Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 567-591, July.
    4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. "Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-1366, September.
    5. Thomas Chaney & David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2012. "The Collateral Channel: How Real Estate Shocks Affect Corporate Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2381-2409, October.
    6. Djankov, Simeon & McLiesh, Caralee & Shleifer, Andrei, 2007. "Private credit in 129 countries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 299-329, May.
    7. Vikrant Vig, 2013. "Access to Collateral and Corporate Debt Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(3), pages 881-928, June.
    8. Fabbri, Daniela & Menichini, Anna Maria C., 2010. "Trade credit, collateral liquidation, and borrowing constraints," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 413-432, June.
    9. Ono, Arito & Uchida, Hirofumi & Udell, Gregory F. & Uesugi, Iichiro, 2021. "Lending pro-cyclicality and macroprudential policy: Evidence from Japanese LTV ratios," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    10. Efraim Benmelech, 2009. "Asset Salability and Debt Maturity: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century American Railroads," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(4), pages 1545-1584, April.
    11. Ulf von Lilienfeld‐Toal & Dilip Mookherjee & Sujata Visaria, 2012. "The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence From Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(2), pages 497-558, March.
    12. Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, 2005. "Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(1), pages 223-246.
    13. Rainer Haselmann & Katharina Pistor & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "How Law Affects Lending," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(2), pages 549-580, February.
    14. Acharya, Viral V. & Bharath, Sreedhar T. & Srinivasan, Anand, 2007. "Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 787-821, September.
    15. Per Strömberg, 2000. "Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2641-2692, December.
    16. Jun Qian & Philip E. Strahan, 2007. "How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(6), pages 2803-2834, December.
    17. Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman, 2008. "Liquidation Values and the Credibility of Financial Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from U.S. Airlines," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(4), pages 1635-1677.
    18. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1994. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 841-879.
    19. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 473-494.
    20. Geraldo Cerqueiro & Steven Ongena & Kasper Roszbach, 2016. "Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates, and Monitoring," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(3), pages 1295-1322, June.
    21. Calomiris, Charles W. & Larrain, Mauricio & Liberti, José & Sturgess, Jason, 2017. "How collateral laws shape lending and sectoral activity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 163-188.
    22. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/75koqefued8i7pihbrl9u84p4u is not listed on IDEAS
    23. José M. Liberti & Atif R. Mian, 2010. "Collateral Spread and Financial Development," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(1), pages 147-177, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Haufler & Ian Wooton, 2016. "Cross-Border Banking in Regulated Markets: Is Financial Integration Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6150, CESifo.
    2. Calomiris, Charles W. & Larrain, Mauricio & Liberti, José & Sturgess, Jason, 2017. "How collateral laws shape lending and sectoral activity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 163-188.
    3. Adriano Campos Menezes & Jaime Orrillo, 2018. "Concerning The Seizure Of Collateral In Collateralized Loan Markets," Annals of Financial Economics (AFE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(03), pages 1-9, September.
    4. Andrea Bellucci & Alexander Borisov & Germana Giombini & Alberto Zazzaro, 2015. "Collateral and Local Lending: Testing the Lender-Based Theory," IAW Discussion Papers 119, Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW).
    5. Pavanini, Nicola & Ioannidou, Vasso & Peng, Yushi, 2019. "Collateral and Asymmetric Information in Lending Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 13905, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hans Degryse & Vasso Ioannidou & José María Liberti & Jason Sturgess, 2020. "How Do Laws and Institutions Affect Recovery Rates for Collateral?," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 1-43.
    2. Juliano J. Assunção & Efraim Benmelech & Fernando S. S. Silva, 2014. "Repossession and the Democratization of Credit," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(9), pages 2661-2689.
    3. Beutler, Toni & Grobéty, Mathieu, 2019. "The collateral channel under imperfect debt enforcement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 336-359.
    4. Calomiris, Charles W. & Larrain, Mauricio & Liberti, José & Sturgess, Jason, 2017. "How collateral laws shape lending and sectoral activity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 163-188.
    5. Ioannidou, Vasso & Pavanini, Nicola & Peng, Yushi, 2022. "Collateral and asymmetric information in lending markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 93-121.
    6. Barbiero, Francesca & Schepens, Glenn & Sigaux, Jean-David, 2022. "Liquidation value and loan pricing," Working Paper Series 2645, European Central Bank.
    7. Cerqueiro, Geraldo & Ongena, Steven & Roszbach, Kasper, 2020. "Collateral damaged? Priority structure, credit supply, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    8. Huang, Guan-Ying & Huang, Henry Hongren & Lee, Chun I, 2020. "Taming the dark side of asset liquidity: The role of short-term debt," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 539-562.
    9. Benmelech, Efraim & Bergman, Nittai K., 2009. "Collateral pricing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 339-360, March.
    10. Fien van Solinge & Beau Soederhuizen, 2023. "European Insolvency Law and Firm Leverage," CPB Discussion Paper 448, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    11. Lei, Jin & Qiu, Jiaping & Wan, Chi, 2018. "Asset tangibility, cash holdings, and financial development," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 223-242.
    12. Xu, Bing, 2019. "Permissible collateral and access to finance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 237-255.
    13. David Schoenherr & Jan Starmans, 2022. "When Should Bankruptcy Law Be Creditor‐ or Debtor‐Friendly? Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(5), pages 2669-2717, October.
    14. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2011. "Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 29-48, Winter.
    15. Ongena, Steven & Cerqueiro, Geraldo & Roszbach, Kasper, 2016. "Collateral damage? On collateral, corporate financing and performance," Working Paper Series 1918, European Central Bank.
    16. Pavanini, Nicola & Ioannidou, Vasso & Peng, Yushi, 2019. "Collateral and Asymmetric Information in Lending Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 13905, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Bernardus Ferdinandus Nazar Van Doornik & Lucio Rodrigues Capelletto, 2015. "Collateral after the Brazilian Creditor Rights Reform," Working Papers Series 404, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    18. Murillo Campello & Mauricio Larrain, 2016. "Enlarging the Contracting Space: Collateral Menus, Access to Credit, and Economic Activity," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(2), pages 349-383.
    19. Nuri Ersahin & Rustom M. Irani & Katherine Waldock, 2016. "Creditor Rights and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Fraudulent Transfer Law," Working Papers 16-31, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    20. Rainer Haselmann & Paul Wachtel, 2010. "Institutions and Bank Behavior: Legal Environment, Legal Perception, and the Composition of Bank Lending," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(5), pages 965-984, August.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11406. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.