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Movables as Collateral and Corporate Credit: Loan-Level Evidence from Legal Reforms across Europe

Author

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  • Ongena, Steven
  • Saffar, Walid
  • Sun, Yuan
  • Wei, Lai

Abstract

Does pledging movables as collateral alter corporate borrowing? To answer this question, we study the effect of collateral law reforms on syndicated bank loans granted across nine European countries that facilitated pledging movables between 1995 and 2019, comparing them to nineteen countries that did not. We find that although the reforms have enabled firms to issue more secured loans, the average cost of the loans and the number of covenants has also increased. Banks may demand more to compensate for both the potential wealth redistribution induced by newly issued secured credit and the extra monitoring involved to mitigate concerns about using movables as collateral.

Suggested Citation

  • Ongena, Steven & Saffar, Walid & Sun, Yuan & Wei, Lai, 2022. "Movables as Collateral and Corporate Credit: Loan-Level Evidence from Legal Reforms across Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 17509, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17509
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost of debt; Collateral laws; Access to credit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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