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Data Abundance and Asset Price Informativeness


  • Dugast, Jérôme
  • Foucault, Thierry


Investors can acquire either raw or processed information about the payoff of risky assets. Information processing filters out the noise in raw information but it takes time. Hence, investors buying processed information trade with a lag relative to investors buying raw information. As the cost of raw information declines, more investors trade on it, which reduces the value of processed information, unless raw information is very unreliable. Thus, a decline in the cost of raw information can reduce the demand for processed information and, for this reason, the informativeness of asset prices in the long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Dugast, Jérôme & Foucault, Thierry, 2016. "Data Abundance and Asset Price Informativeness," CEPR Discussion Papers 11190, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11190

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dionne, Georges & Zhou, Xiaozhou, 2019. "Information Environments and High Price Impact Trades: Implication for Volatility and Price Efficiency," Working Papers 19-3, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management, revised 04 Nov 2019.
    2. Bastian von Beschwitz & Donald B Keim & Massimo Massa, 2020. "First to “Read” the News: News Analytics and Algorithmic Trading," Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 122-178.
    3. Kendall, Chad, 2018. "The time cost of information in financial markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 118-157.
    4. Gider, Jasmin & Schmickler, Simon & Westheide, Christian, 2019. "High-frequency trading and price informativeness," SAFE Working Paper Series 248, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    5. Maryam Farboodi & Adrien Matray & Laura Veldkamp & Venky Venkateswaran, 2020. "Where Has All the Data Gone?," NBER Working Papers 26927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Donald B. Keim & Massimo Massa & Bastian von Beschwitz, 2018. "First to \"Read\" the News: New Analytics and Algorithmic Trading," International Finance Discussion Papers 1233, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. Corey Garriot & Ryan Riordan, 2020. "Trading on Long-term Information," Staff Working Papers 20-20, Bank of Canada.
    8. Meng Gao & Jiekun Huang & Itay GoldsteinEditor, 2020. "Informing the Market: The Effect of Modern Information Technologies on Information Production," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 33(4), pages 1367-1411.
    9. Itay Goldstein & Shijie Yang & Luo Zuo, 2020. "The Real Effects of Modern Information Technologies," NBER Working Papers 27529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Nawn, Samarpan & Banerjee, Ashok, 2019. "Do the limit orders of proprietary and agency algorithmic traders discover or obscure security prices?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 109-125.
    11. Foucault, T., 2016. "Where are the risks in high frequency trading?," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 20, pages 53-67, April.
    12. Jérôme Dugast & Thierry Foucault, 2020. "Equilibrium Data Mining and Data Abundance," Working Papers hal-03053967, HAL.
    13. Banerjee, Snehal & Breon-Drish, Bradyn, 2020. "Strategic trading and unobservable information acquisition," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(2), pages 458-482.
    14. Declerck, F., 2016. "High-frequency trading, geographical concerns and the curvature of the Earth," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 20, pages 153-160, April.

    More about this item


    Contrarian and momentum trading.; Information Processing; Markets for Information; Price Informativeness;

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality


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