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Advertising Competition in the French Free-To-Air Television Broadcasting Industry

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  • Ivaldi, Marc
  • Zhang, Jiekai

Abstract

This paper investigates empirically the advertising competition in the French free TV broadcasting industry in a two-sided framework. We specify a structural model of oligopoly competition of free TVs, and identify the shape and magnitude of the feedback loop between the TV viewers and the advertisers using French market data from March 2008 to December 2013. We contribute to the literature by implementing a simple procedure to test the conduct of TV channels, and identify that the nature of competition is of Cournot type on the French TV advertising market. In line with a decision of French anti-trust authority in 2010 which authorized the acquisition of two free broadcasting TV channels by a big media group under behavioral remedies, a series of competitive analysis has been conducted: We find firstly that the surpls of TV viewers keep raising after the decision of acquisition, suggesting that the implemented policy has been efficient in protecting the consumer surplus; Then, we find, by counterfactual simulation, that the merger of advertising agencies would not affect importantly the equilibrium outcomes in this industry, due to the strong network externalities between the TV viewers and the advertisers.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivaldi, Marc & Zhang, Jiekai, 2015. "Advertising Competition in the French Free-To-Air Television Broadcasting Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 10762, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10762
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    Cited by:

    1. Jiekai ZHANG, 2016. "The impact of advertising length caps on TV: Evidence from the French broadcast TV industry," Working Papers 16-06, NET Institute.
    2. Anderson, Simon P. & Peitz, Martin, 2015. "Media see-saws : winners and losers on media platforms," Working Papers 15-16, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Advertising; Competition; Media; Tv; Two-sided market; Market conduct; Behavioral remedies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising

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