Price symmetry in a duopoly with congestion
We show that in a duopoly operating in a congested market, with a general congestion function and an arbitrary distribution of consumer disutility for congestion, there cannot exist an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. We also show that whenever an equilibrium does exist it is unique. Closed form expressions for the symmetric equilibrium prices and profits are provided.
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